‘Here be revisionary metaphysics!’ A critique of a concern about process philosophy by Giladi, Paul
Giladi, Paul (2021) ‘Here be revisionary metaphysics!’ A critique of a concern




Publisher: Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Cana-
dian Philosophical Association
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0012217321000068




‘Here be revisionary metaphysics!’ A critique of a concern about process philosophy 
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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that John Dupré and Daniel Nicholson’s ‘process manifesto’ 
is ironically more sympathetic to descriptive metaphysics than to revisionary metaphysics. 
Focusing on their argument that any process philosophy automatically slides into 
Whiteheadian obscurantism if it does not just rest content with revealing the problematic 
features of ordinary language, I argue that their position occludes a logical space, one in which 
revisionary metaphysics is articulated without any Whiteheadian obscurantism and involves 
no dereliction of critical/revisionary orientation. I argue that key features of the respective 
critical social ontologies of Judith Butler and Talia Mae Bettcher occupy such a logical space.  
 
RÉSUMÉ : Dans cet article, je soutiens que le «manifeste du processus» de John Dupré et Daniel 
Nicholson est ironiquement plus sympathique à la métaphysique descriptive qu’à la 
métaphysique révisionniste. En me concentrant sur leur argument selon lequel toute 
philosophie du processus glisse automatiquement dans l’obscurantisme whiteheadien 
lorsqu’elle ne se contente pas de révéler seulement les caractéristiques problématiques du 
langage ordinaire, je soutiens que leur position dissimule un espace logique dans lequel la 
métaphysique révisionniste s’articule sans aucun obscurantisme whiteheadien et n’implique 
aucun apauvrissement de l’orientation critique/révisionniste. Je soutiens que les 
caractéristiques clés des ontologies sociales critiques respectives de Judith Butler et Talia Mae 
Bettcher occupent un tel espace logique. 
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“Ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and 
improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word.” J. L. Austin 
 
I. The process manifesto 
In their 2018 ‘process manifesto,’ John Dupré and Daniel Nicholson write that 
 
process philosophers have frequently felt the need to introduce a new lexicon 
in order to come to terms with the processual nature of existence. Whitehead, 
of course, is the most notorious example, and his influence on modern process 
philosophy, including on how it is perceived by those who oppose it, has been 
enormous. However … it is not necessary to appeal to neologisms or resort to 
opaque prose to make the case for process. Thing-locutions, despite their 
pervasiveness, do not have to be taken at face value. After all, our linguistic 
conventions are not always aligned with our ontological convictions …. It 
suffices that we realize that English grammar, like that of other Indo-European 
languages, exhibits a clear bias towards substances, which may well be rooted, 




As I understand Dupré and Nicholson here, the traditional worry about process 
philosophy1 is that it risks sharing the general problem facing “revisionary metaphysics,” to 
use P. F. Strawson’s (1959, p. 9) expression. Rather than describe our existing conceptual 
scheme, namely the structure of how we actually make sense of things, revisionary 
metaphysics recommends wholescale changes to how we actually make sense of things: 
 
Metaphysics has been often revisionary, and less often descriptive. Descriptive 
metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about 
the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure.2 
(Strawson, 1959, p. 9) 
 
For Strawson, the function of descriptive metaphysical inquiry is “to lay bare the most 
general features of our conceptual structure” (Strawson, 1959, p. 9). Specifically, the drive 
underpinning this function is a cognitive orientation towards sense-making at a sufficiently 
general level, but at a level that is “not general enough and not far-reaching enough to meet 
the full metaphysical demand for understanding” (Strawson, 1959, p. 10). What I take 
Strawson to mean here is that descriptive metaphysics is epistemically humble, to the extent 
that it has a more limited scope than the scope of revisionary metaphysics. Descriptive 
metaphysics recognizes the bounds of our sense-making and is especially keen to rein in our 
cognitive propensity for sense-making at the most general level. The extent to which 
descriptive metaphysics does this means that descriptive metaphysics involves a particular 
type of second-order discourse: it is interested in making sense of how we make sense of 
things, by revealing the “central core of human thinking” (Strawson, 1959, p. 10). 
Descriptive metaphysics, as such, seeks not to provide an explanation of how our 
conceptual scheme depends on contingent background conditions. Rather, descriptive 
metaphysics is directed to describing the various interconnections between the fundamental 
concepts that constitute our ordinary conceptual scheme.3 Certain categorial features of our 
ordinary conceptual scheme, so the Kant-inspired story goes, are indispensable, and hence 
immune to the doubts of sceptics and to the reforms of revisionary metaphysicians: 
descriptive metaphysical inquiry delegitimizes those sceptical threats seeking to cast doubt 
on the validity of our ordinary conceptual scheme, because core commitments of our ordinary 
conceptual scheme are indispensable for intelligible human experience; and descriptive 
metaphysical inquiry undermines the viability of revisionary metaphysics, because if certain 
categorial features of our ordinary conceptual scheme are indispensable for human 
experience, then they cannot be replaced on pain of no longer having intelligible human 
experience. 
Indeed, one such reform of revisionary metaphysics Strawson himself is especially 
keen on countering concerns the possibility of process metaphysics, which he aims to 
undercut through a descriptive metaphysical argument that only ordinary three-dimensional 
middle-sized objects (i.e., substances) can serve as the basic intentional objects of our 
referential practices.4 Strawson’s argument can be formalized in the following way: 
 
 
1 Process philosophy is diametrically opposed to substance as a basic ontological category. 
2 Cf. “Descriptive metaphysics is concerned with the concepts that form the stable core of all human thought” 
(Glock, 2012, p. 394).  
3 Viz. Strawson, 1959, p. 247. 
4 Viz. Strawson, 1959, pp. 15–39. 
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• We refer to objects in the world. 
• For us to be in a position to refer to objects in the world, a necessary condition for 
those objects being candidates for reference is that those objects possess the 
properties of distinguishability and re-identifiability. 
• Distinguishability and re-identifiability are conditions of referential identification for 
language-users, and require a framework that enables language-users to locate 
particular things. 
• A framework that enables language-users to locate particular things must involve 
entities that are diverse, rich, stable, and that endure.5  
• Only one category of entities possesses these required features, namely ordinary 
three-dimensional objects. 
• Therefore, material bodies must be basic. 
 
Revisionary metaphysicians, by contrast, repudiate our ordinary conceptual scheme, 
on the grounds that it is chimerical. Invariably, the revisionary impulse seems to congeal to 
the point where the practices of articulating a revisionary vocabulary and the Nietzsche-
inspired practice of creating new (and better) concepts means that, for les personnages 
conceptuels,6 ordinary vocabulary and discursive formations (i.e., ordinary conceptual 
frameworks and epistemic practices of inquiry) just will not do. Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari express a similar point:  
 
First, concepts are and remain signed: Aristotle’s substance, Descartes’s cogito, 
Leibniz’s monad, Kant’s condition, Schelling’s power, Bergson’s duration. But 
also, some concepts must be indicated by an extraordinary and sometimes 
even barbarous or shocking word, whereas others make do with an ordinary, 
everyday word that is filled with harmonics so distant that it risks being 
imperceptible to a nonphilosophical ear. Some concepts call for archaisms, and 
others for neologisms, shot through with almost crazy etymological exercises 
…. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 7–8) 
  
However, if one is increasingly convinced that ordinary conceptual schemes and 
vocabularies are irredeemably vitiated with errors and even ideological inflections,7 then it 
seems the only mode of language available to the revisionary metaphysician is one that, for 
all its creativity and novelty, is more and more likely to be unintelligible and obscure. For all 
of the attractiveness of the revisionary metaphysician’s insistence on creative discursive 
experimentation, such creative discursive experimentations without concrete linguistic 
anchoring may be interesting from a literary perspective, but they are vacuous from a 
philosophical perspective. For, to quote Bernard Williams, philosophy “… should introduce 
our ordinary concerns in a humanly recognisable form” (Williams, 2006, p. 206). 
From an analytic philosophical perspective, I think reflecting on the following 
challenge to predicate nominalism is a particularly helpful way of further explicating the 
general worry about revisionary philosophical language. This is because predicate 
 
5 Otherwise, candidates for reference cannot be distinguishable and re-identifiable. 
6 Viz. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 2. 
7 By this, I mean forms of domination, oppression, marginalization, and violence. Viz. Marcuse, 2003, p. 196. 
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nominalism, as articulated by W. V. O. Quine (and supported by Michael Devitt (1980, 1997)), 
seems a paradigmatic instance of revisionary metaphysics.8 According to Quine: 
 
One may admit that there are red houses, roses, and sunsets, but deny, except 
as a popular and misleading manner of speaking, that they have anything in 
common …. That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be 
taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held that McX is no better off, 
in point of real explanatory power, for all the occult entities which he posits 
under such names as ‘redness’ …. We may say, for example, that some dogs 
are white and not thereby commit ourselves to recognising either doghood or 
whiteness as entities. ‘Some dogs are white’ says that some things that are 
dogs are white; and, in order that this statement be true, the things over which 
the bound variable ‘something’ ranges must include some white dogs, but need 
not include doghood or whiteness …. A theory is committed to those and only 
those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of 
referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true. (Quine, 
1948, pp. 29–30, pp. 32, 33) 
  
For Quine, McX mistakenly thinks that a semantic theory can only do justice to 
predicate-ascriptions if such a theory takes predicates with great ontological seriousness. In 
place of McX’s traditional construal of ontological commitment, Quine’s alternative criterion 
proposes a revisionary paraphrase: x (some concrete particular) is f (some property), because 
there exists a term that designates x and that f applies to x.9 Under such a revisionary 
paraphrase, which favours desert landscapes and ontological sparsity, one is not ontologically 
committed to a universal in the regimented sentence, as to make ‘x is f’ true does not require 
the existence of a universal. 
However, one can claim that it is impossible to find a satisfactory revisionary 
paraphrase of propositions involving predicate-ascriptions in which reference to universals is 
eliminated10: for, the idea that one can establish the truth-conditions of the proposition ‘x is 
f’ by claiming that ‘is f’ applies to x seems implausible. In resisting a non-nominalist semantic 
theory, predicate nominalism appears to follow the conduct of an ostrich thrusting its head 
 
8 Another, but, of course, very different type of revisionary metaphysics would be Hegel’s speculative idealism, 
which represents a direct response and critical alternative to Kant’s proto-descriptive metaphysical insistence 
that “… the proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognitions of things in general 
… must give way to the more modest title of a transcendental analytic” (Kant, 1781/1787/1998, 
A247/B304). The essence of Hegel’s elaborate post-Kantian speculative system, where the ontological focus is 
on becoming rather than on being, is not an endorsement of replacing ontology with the a priori science of 
transcendental judgement — which one can take to be the spirit of the Copernican turn in philosophy — but 
rather a commitment to the fundamentally self-reflective nature of inquiry. What I mean by this is that the 
dialectical shift from Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalist metaphysics to transcendental idealism, for Hegel, does 
not culminate in any kind of eliminativism or ‘bald’ naturalism. On the contrary, the shift provides inquirers 
with the clues for seeing how both metaphysics and transcendental philosophy can now be transformed into 
speculative philosophy. As such, when Robert Pippin writes that “thereafter [Kant’s Critique of pure reason], 
instead of an a priori science of substance, a science of ‘how the world must be’ … a putative philosophical 
science was directed to the topic of how any subject must ‘for itself’ take or construe or judge the world to be” 
(Pippin, 1990, p. 839; cf. Bird, 2006, p. 96), his understanding of the thrust of the post-Kantian directive is too 
narrow. As Brady Bowman writes, “Post Kant is not necessarily propter Kant” (Bowman, 2013, p. 3). 
9 Cf. Devitt, 1997, p. 96.  
10 Cf. Armstrong, 1997, pp. 105, 108. 
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into the sand.11 Indeed, one could even propose that the notion of ‘applying a term/predicate 
to a subject’ involves an ontological commitment to a relation — and if that is the case, then 
Quine’s predicate nominalism may well collapse into a form of realism. And if Quine’s 
predicate nominalism may well collapse into a form of realism, not in the least having buckled 
under the weight of the implausibility of its paraphrasing strategy, then the failure here would 
provide more than just a cautionary tale to inquirers wishing to make “an imaginative leap” 
(Whitehead, 1929/1978, p. 4). Here be revisionary metaphysics! 
Now, Dupré and Nicholson, as process philosophers, are ipso facto revisionary 
metaphysicians. I think this point is uncontroversial, and, therefore, does not need a 
supporting argument. Crucially, however, they recognize problems with construing the task 
of revisionary metaphysics (in their specific case, process philosophy) in terms of providing a 
philosophic vocabulary that forces our ordinary discursive architecture — i.e., the overall 
design of our concepts and the way we make sense of things — out of the picture. In place of 
such a conception of revisionary discourse, they argue that it is sufficient for revisionary 
metaphysics (in their specific case, process philosophy) to recognize that ordinary ontological 
language and technical ontological convictions do not often marry well, that ordinary 
ontological language, riddled with its bias towards substance and kinds essentialism, is just a 
popular and misleading manner of speaking.  
 
II. Logical occlusion and discursive conservatism 
However, I do not find persuasive Dupré and Nicholson’s claim that it is enough for process 
philosophy (and, therefore, revisionary metaphysics) for inquirers to be aware of problems 
with ordinary vocabulary, to be aware of problems with ordinary ways of making sense of 
things, and to recognize the hegemony of substance-discourse.12 My concern is that a 
questionable, exhaustive conceptual binary is something to which Dupré and Nicholson are 
committed. The binary in question regards revisionary metaphysics (in their specific case, 
process philosophy) either as comprising Whiteheadian obscurantism, or as involving mere 
recognition of how ordinary linguistic conventions do not synchronize with ontological 
convictions. In this respect, the exhaustive conceptual binary underpinning their position 
occludes a fertile logical space, one in which revisionary metaphysics (in this specific case, 
process philosophy) is articulated without any Whiteheadian obscurantism and involves no 
significant dereliction of critical/revisionary orientation and inclination. 
Directly connected to this point is, I think, an extra dimension to the charge just 
levelled against Dupré and Nicholson. Specifically, the extra dimension involves going further 
than contending that they occlude a fertile conceptual space for revisionary discourse devoid 
of Whiteheadian levels of obscure neologisms and lexical opacity. In order to articulate this 
extra dimension, I would like to draw attention to the following arguments by Herbert 
Marcuse and Adrian Moore respectively:  
 
 
11 The term ‘ostrich nominalism’ was initially coined by David Armstrong (1978).  
12 The following passages from Johanna Seibt’s work are particularly helpful for evidencing the hegemony of 
the substance-paradigm: “From Aristotle onwards, ontology has been under the spell of what I have called the 
‘myth of substance’ — a set of unreflected presuppositions for ontological theory construction that prescribe a 
focus on static entities, mainly a dualism of particulars and universals, as the most ‘natural’ way to describe 
the structure of the world” (Seibt, 2018b, p. 113). “The myth of substance consists in a network of 
presuppositions which, in combination, engender the belief that the traditional category dualism of substance 
and attribute provides the most ‘natural’ articulation of the ontological commitments of everyday discourse” 
(Seibt, 1996, p. 121). See also Rescher, 2000, p. 4. 
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However, what is at stake is not the definition or the dignity of philosophy. It is 
rather the chance of preserving and protecting the right, the need to think and 
speak in terms other than those of common usage — terms which are 
meaningful, rational, and valid precisely because they are other terms. What is 
involved is the spread of a new ideology which undertakes to describe what is 
happening (and meant) by eliminating the concepts capable of understanding 
what is happening (and meant). (Marcuse, 2003, p. 183) 
 
Why then should anyone think that, as practising metaphysicians, we are 
limited to making sense of things in broadly the same way as we already do? 
Well, the phrase ‘as practising metaphysicians’ is critical. One view would be 
the following. Anyone operating at a lower level of generality, attempting to 
make relatively specific sense of relatively specific things, can have occasion to 
innovate in all sorts of ways, but the metaphysician, responding to nothing but 
the sheer demand to make sense of things, should be concerned only to protect 
whatever sense-making is already under way, in particular to protect it from 
confusion: any innovation not prompted by some specific need merely carries 
the risk of new confusion. (That is not by any means a crazy view, although it is 
always in danger of degenerating into a conservative resistance even to non-
metaphysical innovation — a resistance, more specifically, to any departure, at 
any level of generality, from ‘ordinary language’ — which really is crazy.) 
(Moore, 2012, p. 11) 
 
Why should anyone think that, as practising metaphysicians, we have license 
to make sense of things in a way that is radically new? Because it is not clear 
that our most general way of making sense of things cannot be radically 
improved …. [T]hat is the very simple, very basic reason for taking revisionary 
metaphysics seriously …. And the point is simply this. It is unclear why we 
should eschew anything of that sort. It is unclear why we should think that 
nothing of that sort could ever be to our advantage. (Moore, 2012, pp. 12–13) 
 
The extra dimension to my critique of Dupré and Nicholson is a Frankfurt School 
critical theoretic-inspired one, namely that their occlusion of a fertile logical space for non-
obscurantist revisionary metaphysics risks revealing, what I would like to call, ‘discursive 
conservatism’ on their part. By ‘discursive conservatism,’ I mean a staunch resistance to 
radically changing and altering ordinary conceptual schemes and vocabularies, to the point of 
allowing oneself “… to be frightened off by an initial impression of strangeness” (Frege, 
1879/1970/2013, p. 7). For Marcuse — perhaps even more so than Moore, given Marcuse’s 
explicit critical theoretic contention that ordinary language is ideologically saturated — 
discursive conservatism ultimately congeals into a hostile, reactionary attitude. From this 
perspective, discursive conservatism comprises “the defamation of alternative modes of 
thought which contradict the established universe of discourse” (Marcuse, 2003, p. 178). In 
this way, discursive conservatism preserves the discursive status quo and counter threats to 
it. 
Under my proposed Frankfurt School critical theoretic-inspired framework, then, 
there is something especially troubling about Dupré and Nicholson’s position. Their 
contention in their ‘process manifesto’ — that any revisionary metaphysics that does not just 
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rest content with recognizing the ways in which ordinary language is problematic 
automatically slides into obscurantism, opacity, and obfuscation — reveals some type of 
ironic anxiety, perhaps even an ironic ideological13 fear of “radically new forms of sense-
making” (Moore, 2012, p. 192), an ironic fear of Deleuzean levels of creativity,14 and an ironic 
reactionary disposition to genuinely challenging and even overcoming the discursive status 
quo.15 
This is a significant point, as the specific kind of transformative revisionary power I 
have in mind here differs from, for instance, Frege’s construal of conceptual innovation 
through the articulation of formal language. For, Frege — in both the Preface to the 
Begriffsschrift (1879/1970/2013, pp. 6–7) and in The foundations of arithmetic (§2) — does 
not aim to bring about radical changes in how we make sense of things. As Moore correctly 
notes, Frege “intended to exploit, nurture, and consolidate sense-making of ours that is 
already under way” (Moore 2012, p. 197). He is, therefore, a reformer.16 However, to use an 
expression from James Ladyman and Don Ross, process philosophy — as an important 
instance of revisionary metaphysics — does not seek to nurture or consolidate the substance 
paradigm: everything about the substance paradigm must go in this context. To this extent, 
then, I think that the process philosopher’s goal is a type of creative ‘subversion’ in Deleuze’s 
technical sense.17 This is, in part, evidenced by the general processist contention that certain 
explanatory functions are performed best by relational, as opposed to substantival, 
categories.18 For, relational, as opposed to substantival, categories enable one to regard 
“contingency, emergence, novelty, and creativity … among the fundamental categories of 
metaphysical understanding” (Rescher, 2000, p. 6). Such categories are vital for making sense 
of the natural and social world. As Johanna Seibt and Dupré & Nicholson respectively write:  
 
Process ontology … becomes most powerful once it leaves the habitual 
presumptions of the substance paradigm behind. (Seibt, 2018a, p. 121) 
 
Process ontology … is far more attuned to and concordant with the 
understanding of the living world … than is its substantialist rival. (Dupré & 
Nicholson, 2018, p. 22) 
 
 
13 ‘Ideologies,’ to use the technical Marxist sense, are practices and modes of thought that present aspects of 
human existence (political configurations, conceptual schemes, etc.) that are historical and changeable as 
eternal and unchangeable. 
14 Viz. Bergson, 1922, pp. 209–210. Viz. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 2, 82–83. See also Deleuze, 2006, p. 100. 
15 I take my expression ‘the discursive status quo’ as equivalent to Marcuse’s expression ‘the established 
universe of discourse.’ Under Max Horkheimer’s programmatic articulation of a critical theory of society 
(Horkheimer, 1937/1972), a critical social theory is adequate only if it meets three criteria simultaneously: the 
theory must be explanatory, practical, and normative. The theory must (1) explain what is wrong (i.e., 
normatively deficient) with current social reality, (2) clearly identify which agents (and/or social, political, legal, 
economic institutions) are required to progressively change current social reality, and (3) provide both valid 
norms for social critique as well as articulate an achievable vision of emancipation from all the circumstances 
that currently enslave human beings. 
16 To clarify, this is not necessarily a bad thing to be.  
17 Viz. Deleuze, 1983, p. 53. There is an interesting question about whether Talia Mae Bettcher’s (2013) 
position is creatively subversive to this extent as well. 
18 See also Bickhard (2003; 2009), Campbell (2015), Geach (1950), Puntel (2007), Rescher (1996; 2000), and 
Sellars (1960).  
8 
 
Rather than engage in the descriptive metaphysical project of providing a topography 
of our actual conceptual framework, and then, where possible, offer piecemeal tweaks here-
and-there to “the established universe of discourse,”19 I think a revisionary metaphysician 
should redesign the way in which we currently make sense of things through the creation and 
development of a new discursive architecture. For a process philosopher, tode ti is ideology; 
substance is ‘crime,’ paraphrasing Adolf Loos (1913/1929/2016).20  
In an ironic way, Dupré and Nicholson’s conception of revisionary metaphysics — 
namely, that it is sufficient for process philosophy to merely recognize bias and ideology in 
our actual conceptual scheme — may be viewed as having more kinship with P. M. S. Hacker’s 
descriptive metaphysical commitment to “concepts and categories that we could not 
abandon without ceasing to be human” (Hacker, 2001, p. 368) than with the process 
philosophy of Seibt. 
Crucially, in response to Hacker’s Wittgensteinian conservatism, while I think it is 
reasonable to contend that there are concepts and categories we could not abandon without 
ceasing to be human, I would think a more expressive, revisionary, and — crucially — 
politically sensitive imagination recognizes that there are concepts, categories, and 
frameworks we must abandon to not simply retain, but more saliently, even perfect our 
humanity. By doing this, following Judith Butler, one is much better equipped to “… produce 
new forms of intimacy, alliance, and communicability” (Butler, 2004, p. 208).21 
I think the revisionary (specifically, progressive) discourse of producing new forms of 
intimacy, alliance, and communicability cannot be overstated. For, producing new forms of 
intimacy, alliance, and communicability is a democratic activity in the technical Deweyan 
sense: John Dewey makes it clear that democracy should not be understood as a purely 
political concept. As he writes: 
 
A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of 
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space 
of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to 
refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to 
give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those 
barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from perceiving 
the full import of their activity. (Dewey, 1916/2004, p. 93) 
 
What democracy involves is more basic than either a type of constitution empowering 
voters or a type of government typified by majority rule. Democracy, rather, is a set of values 
 
19 The core network of categorial concepts and forms of thought would also be equivalent here.  
20 Loos’ iconic essay “Ornament and crime” was first published in French (“Ornement et crime”) in 1913 in Les 
cahiers d’aujourd’hui. His essay was then published in German (“Ornament und verbrechen”) in 1929 in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung. 
21 Curiously, Hacker appears much more open to both the possibility and desirability of revisionary theory in 
practical philosophy, rather than in theoretical philosophy: “in practical philosophy there is room for the 
introduction of novel first-order concepts and for the remoulding of existing concepts” (Hacker, 2009, p. 150). 
This is because his revisionism about ethical, social, and political inquiry, but not about metaphysical and 
scientific inquiry, hinges on the following premise (an unhelpful, outdated bifurcation of theoretical and 
practical philosophy): “The concepts of concern to theoretical philosophy are employed primarily in the 
description and explanation of what is (or is not) actually the case. But the central concepts that engage our 
attention in practical philosophy articulate our conception of the ideal — of what we ought to be and what we 
ought to do” (Hacker, 2009, p. 150). Contra Hacker, the imbrication of power and how we make sense of 
things means that metaphysical and scientific inquiry can never possibly be value-neutral in the first place. 
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comprising a particular form of associating with others. For Dewey, democracy is a way of 
living. As Alison Kadlec correctly notes, “democracy, then, cannot be reduced to a set of 
institutional functions or abstract visions of the state” (Kadlec, 2006, p. 537). Crucially, in 
Dewey’s sense, a democratic way of life is the life of inquiry, where inquiry, à la Charles 
Sanders Peirce, is open, non-dogmatic, inclusive, fallibilist, ceaseless, critical problem-solving 
experimentation. To this extent, then, the democratic life and the inquiring life are mutually 
supportive, insofar as democratic environments promote and sustain inquiry, and inquiry 
promotes and sustains democracy. 
Understood in such a way, open, non-dogmatic, inclusive, fallibilist, ceaseless, critical 
problem-solving experimentation is exactly what motivates the revisionary metaphysician. To 
elaborate my point in some detail, I would like to focus on two recent examples from the 
philosophical literature on social ontology — Butler’s notion of gender as performative 
activity; and Talia Mae Bettcher’s ‘multiple-meanings’ position. I think these two positions 
occupy precisely that fertile logical space in which revisionary metaphysics can be articulated 
without any (putative) Whiteheadian obscurantism and involves no significant dereliction of 
critical/revisionary orientation. 
 
(a) Butler  
In order to overcome the limitations of traditional theorizing about gender and its 
corresponding story of border-control political representation and participation, Butler (1992, 
2004, 2006) has argued that one ought to adopt a ‘performativity thesis’ about gender. A 
performativity thesis necessarily involves understanding, for example, ‘woman’ as “a term in 
process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or to end. As 
an ongoing discursive practice, it is open to intervention and resignification” (Butler, 2006, p. 
43). Crucially, a performativity thesis is decidedly uninterested in making sense of gender by 
successfully questing for individuating metaphysical properties serving as necessary and 
sufficient ontological conditions for membership of a gender group. Rather, gender is made 
sense of qua relationally defined and genealogically situated performative acts.22 
The relationally defined and genealogically situated performative activities sustained 
by historically mediated practices of recognition are complex through-and-through, to the 
extent that repetitively produced performative stylized acts are “constellation[s] of ever-
changing processes of articulation and organization” (Moore, 2012, p. 546): I think to be 
gendered, therefore, is not to satisfy a fixed set of biological or cultural criteria, but, à la He-
Yin Zhen’s concept of nannü,23 to be baptized in a system of reproducing symbolic and 
material power relations imbuing one’s body and experiences with social significance. 
 
22 For Deleuze and Guattari, the concept ‘woman’ would be “something indiscernible that is not so much 
synesthetic [relating to synaesthesia, the neurophenomenological condition where, for example, hearing a 
sound stimulates taste-sensations as well as visual sensations] as syneidetic [the activity of making normative 
judgements]” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 20). 
23 Chinese historians traditionally know He-Yin Zhen (何殷震) as He Zhen (何震). However, as Lydia Liu, 
Rebecca Karl, and Dorothy Ko note, “[i]n her published works, [she] prefers to sign her name He-Yin Zhen so as 
to include her mother’s maiden name [Yin] in the family name [He]” (Liu, Karl, & Ko, 2013, p. 2). Therefore, out 
of respect for her, I use her preferred surname, as do Liu, Karl, and Ko. On the one hand, nannü can be 
legitimately translated as ‘gender,’ as, for example, in the case of translating nannü pindeng (‘gender equality’) 
into English. On the other hand, in her essays, He-Yin uses ‘nannü’ as both noun and adjective, to the extent 
that it is a significantly complex political ontological category “that lies at the foundation of all patriarchal 
abstractions and markings of distinction” (Liu, Karl, & Ko, 2013, p. 11). Nannü is, in effect, a totalizing field of 
power relations responsible for all types of Confucian-instituted hierarchy in China. In this respect, nannü 
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Genders and gendered traits (like ‘nurturing’ or ‘ambitious’) are the “intended or 
unintended product[s] of a social practice” (Haslanger, 1995, p. 97). Females become women 
through symbolic and material processes whereby they acquire ‘womanly’ traits and learn 
‘womanly’ conduct.24 Children are often dressed in gender-specific clothes and colours, and 
parents tend to buy their children gender-specific toys and games. Parents also (regardless of 
intentions) tend to reaffirm certain ‘appropriate’ gender-specific behaviours: girls qua ‘girls’ 
are often discouraged from playing sports like rugby; boys qua ‘boys’ are often told not to cry. 
As He-Yin writes, “by [saying] ‘men’ (nanxing) and ‘women’ (nüxing) we are not speaking of 
‘nature,’ as each is but the outcome of differing social customs and education” (He-Yin, 
1907/2013, p. 184). 
In this respect, I think He-Yin would somewhat agree with Butler’s post-structuralist 
position that gender is not “a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; 
rather, gender is … instituted … through a stylized repetition of [habitual] acts” (Butler, 2006, 
p. 179).25 These habitual acts include wearing certain clothing that marks one’s gender, 
moving and positioning one’s body in a way that marks one’s gender, etc. Understood in such 
a manner, performativity and its new vocabulary involves, what I would call, ‘pragmatic 
processist constitution’: gender is not something one is; gender is something one does; it is 
an integrated sequence of symbolic and material acts functionally linked to one another, a 
relational , rather than a substantival being.26 The symbolic and material processes of 
repeating and institutionalizing these gendering acts crystallizes gender, invariably 
encouraging people to think of gender as a natural kind. This is the root cause of oppressive 
gender norms. Having discussed important features of Butler’s critical social ontology, I now 
wish to turn attention to Bettcher’s position. 
 
(b) Bettcher 
Bettcher (2013) has articulated a position illustrating the particular complexity of the 
metaphysical category of ‘woman.’ Her position partly comprises an argument against using 
Jennifer Saul’s semantic contextualism27 for the purpose of establishing the metaphysical 
claim that trans women are women. According to Bettcher, Saul’s contextualist construal of 
gender terms as indexicals — i.e., construing the extension of ‘woman’ as operating in the 
same semantic manner as ‘night’ — means that a trans woman cannot deny there are 
contexts in which she is not a woman even though she is a woman in other contexts. For, this 
is precisely what would have to happen under the indexical framework, since indexicals are 
subject to context-specific variations — e.g., now it is 20:00 (at T1 [20:00]); now it is 21:00 (at 
T2 [21:00]). In this way, under semantic contextualism, “trans women come out as marginal 
 
“exceeds and resists facile rendition into ‘man and woman,’ ‘gender,’ ‘male/female,’ or other familiar English 
concepts” (Liu, Karl, & Ko, 2013, p. 11). He-Yin is virtually unknown in either analytic or continental feminist 
circles. See Zarrow (1988) and Liu, Karl, & Ko (2013) for further on this extraordinary anarcho-feminist. 
24 For He-Yin, however, certain people (as opposed to simply females) become women through symbolic and 
material processes whereby they acquire ‘womanly’ traits and learn ‘womanly’ conduct, since the distinction 
between female/woman as categories is not one that she thinks pre-dates dominating gender relations. 
25 I write ‘somewhat’ because stylized repetition does not quite capture the more explicitly relational way that 
He-Yin specifically thinks about gender in terms of hierarchical relations of domination. This is partly why she 
thinks that achieving full relational equality means that the gender categories of nan and nü will eventually 
disappear — all of which is, at least in principle, compatible with the survival of stylized repetition of relevant 
habitual acts. 
26 Cf. Barad, 2003, p. 803. 
27 See Saul (2012).  
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cases of womanhood” (Ásta, 2018, p. 87). And since they come out as marginal cases, this 
means, in effect, that trans women are women(ish). Therefore, using semantic contextualism 
to argue for the metaphysical claim ‘trans women are women’ falls flat on its face. Because 
semantic contextualism is incapable of “entirely validating” (Bettcher, 2017, p. 127) trans 
people, it is neither helpful nor conducive for trans liberation politics; although the semantic 
contextualist conclusion that trans women are women(ish) does not intend to ontologically 
(and politically) delegitimate trans women in the overtly reactionary way the proposition 
‘trans women are not women’ functions to do, the semantic contextualist contribution to 
ameliorative social ontological discourse is, at best, insipid, and, at worst, insincere. 
Bettcher’s ameliorative28 ‘multiple-meanings’ position, which is rooted in the specific 
ways trans people themselves make sense of their own gender identity (in Bettcher’s case, 
the trans activist subcultures of Los Angeles), convincingly articulates how the category 
‘woman’ is highly complex. For, as Bettcher argues, ‘woman’ qua dominant cisnormative 
forms of life cannot be legitimately applied to trans women (on pain of misgendering, 
marginalization, and erasure), and ‘woman’ qua trans subculture forms of life cannot be 
applied to cis women (on pain of the incommensurability involved with a “meaning conflict” 
(Bettcher, 2013, p. 234) brought about by trans subcultures contesting cisnormativity). 
Crucially, the articulation of “woman-D” (Bettcher, 2013, p. 244) (‘woman’ in the dominant, 
cisnormative sense) and “woman-R” (Bettcher, 2013, p. 244) (‘woman’ in the resistant, trans 
subcultural sense) is no variation of semantic contextualism, insofar as Bettcher’s position has 
no implicit or explicit commitments to a new contextually relative standard of womanhood. 
Bettcher’s position, rather, is in the business of revisionary sense-making, because, as she 
writes, “[i]t makes more sense to speak of a transformation in meaning or concept than to 
speak of a new contextualized relative standard” (Bettcher, 2013, p. 244). 
I think it is clear that what drives Butler’s and Bettcher’s respective critical social 
ontologies is not just “experimental adventure” (Whitehead, 1929/1978, p. 9). Their 
revisionary — specifically ameliorative — drive aims to transform ordinary vocabulary for the 
emancipatory purpose of ending oppression, domination, and marginalization, and to enable 
more democratic forms of association: 
 
For the purposes of a radical democratic transformation, we need to know that 
our fundamental categories can and must be expanded to become more 
inclusive and more responsive to the full range of cultural populations. This does 
not mean that a social engineer plots at a distance how best to include 
everyone in his or her category. It means that the category itself must be 
subjected to a reworking from myriad directions, that it must emerge anew as 
a result of the cultural translations it undergoes. What moves me politically, 
and that for which I want to make room, is the moment in which a subject — a 
person, a collective — asserts a right or entitlement to a liveable life when no 
such prior authorisation exists, when no clearly enabling convention is in place. 
(Butler, 2004, pp. 223–224. Emphasis added) 
 
Butler’s and Bettcher’s respective positions have explicitly concrete anchoring in the 
struggles of vulnerable social groups to avoid forms of violence on a daily basis, and, in many 
cases, even the constantly heightened risk of ontological delegitimation and metaphysical 
 
28 See Haslanger (2012) for further on amelioration.  
12 
 
degradation. Given the struggles and distress of oppressed and marginalized social groups, it 
is not sufficient to better carve the social at its joints. One must have in view whether the 
metaphysical categories we currently use to make sense of gender are not just themselves 
prone to ideological distortion and vitiation, but that those categories also symbolically and 
materially harm people. This is why, as Sally Haslanger writes, “[a]t the most general level, 
the task is to develop accounts of gender … that will be effective in the fight against injustice” 
(Haslanger, 2012, p. 226).29 
I have argued against Dupré and Nicholson’s contention in their ‘process manifesto’ 
that any process philosophy not just resting content with recognizing the ways in which 
ordinary language is problematic automatically slides into opacity and obfuscation. 
Specifically, I have argued that their ironic resistance to a genuinely radical revisionary 
discourse reveals some type of anxiety, perhaps even an ironic fear of radically new forms of 
sense-making, an ironic fear of Deleuzean levels of creativity, and even a reactionary 
disposition to genuinely challenging and even overcoming the discursive status quo. Dupré 
and Nicholson’s ‘process manifesto,’ therefore, has ironically more sympathy with Hacker’s 
descriptive metaphysical orientation, than with revisionary metaphysical orientations, such as 
Seibt’s process ontology and the respective critical social ontologies of Butler and Bettcher.  
The respective critical social ontologies of Butler and Bettcher are not dialectically 
satisfied with acknowledging problems with ordinary ways of making sense of gender and 
with acknowledging the persistence of ideology in our categorial frameworks and discursive 
architecture. Their respective revisionary metaphysics occupy precisely that fertile logical 
space occluded by Dupré and Nicholson’s argument in their ‘process manifesto’ in which 
revisionary metaphysics can be articulated without any Whiteheadian obscurantism and 
involves no significant dereliction of critical/revisionary orientation. 
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